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TAXATION ANDEXCESSBURDEN:
A LIFE CYCLE PERSPECTIVE
ABSTRACT
A lifetime perspective is appropriate in assessing the welfare implications
of government tax policies. Although a number of attempts have beenmade to ex-
amine the excess burden of taxation in life-cycle models, these havetended to
ignore the role of human capital accumulation and/or theleisure—income choice.
In this paper, we do numerical simulations with a model thattakes both of these
phenomena into account.
We find that under reasonable assumptions, the failure totake into.account
distortions of human capital decisions produces substantialunderestimates of the
excess burden of income taxation. In addition, allowingfor the endogeneity of
human capital increases the efficiency of a personal consumptiontax relative to
that of an equal yield income tax.
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(0703) 559122 609—452—4022I.INTRODUCTION
Proper understanding of many important economic decisions requires
that.theybe viewed in a life cycle context. Similarly, such a perspec—
tiye.is appropriate in assessing the welfare implications of government
tax policies. Quite possibly, a tax that appears efficient from the
point of view of one year may be inefficient in a life cycle perspective
because of intertemporal allocation effects.
This important point was made several years ago by Levhari and
Sheshinski 119721 when they analyzed the excess burden of an income tax
in a model of lifetime utility maximization. However, as Levhari and
Sheshinski recognized, their model was characterized by several restric-
tive features: (a) Utility depended only upon the lifetime consumption
vector --thevalue of leisure was ignored;(b) The elasticity of the
marginal utility of consumption was constrained to be unity; and (c)
There was no consideration of pre—tax wage determination; i.e., earnings
capacity was exogenous rather than generated by rational human capital
investment decisions. Even more recent models of taxpolicy in life cycle
models have tended to ignore the role of human capital accumulation.1
The payoff for such restrictive assumptions is thatthey allow the
derivation of an elegant analytic expression forexcess burden. The
problem is that the substantial lack of "realism" precludes thepossibil-
ity of producing numerical estimates of what the welfare costs of taxation
might actually be. An important purpose of thispaper is to study via
1
See, for examples, King [1980] or Summers [1980].—2—
simulations the impact of taxation in a model that allows for endogenous
leisure and human capital decisions. Our main focus is on how the life-
time excess burden of an income tax varies with key behavioral parameters.
However, the study also sheds light on such issues as the relative effi-
ciency of income and consumption taxes, and the consequences of failing to
account for human investment decisions when considering the welfare costs
of taxation.
In Section II we describe the model of lifetime earnings and labor
supply, and explain how its parameters are set. The simulation results
are presented and discussed in Section III. A final section contains a
sununaryandsuggestions for future research.
II. THE MODEL
A.Framework
Theoretical analysis of the individual's allocation o time over the
life cycle has been done by a number of investigators (see Blinder and
Weiss {1976], Heckman 11976] or Ryder, Stafford and Stephan 11975]). In
basic structure the models are quite similar. Each period the individual
divides his time between work, leisure and training (either at school or
on—the-job). Earnings capacity in a given period depends on past training,
i.e., the stock of human capital. Saving and borrowing can be done freely,
subject to the constraint that there be no outstanding debts at the end of
the life. All parameters of the model are known withcertainty,2 and
2Problems which arise as a consequence of stochastic returns to human
capitalare treated by Levhari and Weiss 11974] and Eaton and Rosen119801.—3—
conditional on their values, the individual maximizesautility function
which depends upon vectors of leisure, consumption, and possibly bequests.
Such models have been quite successful in reproducing the stylized
facts of observed life cycles: early specialization in formal schooling
followed by entry into the labor force, at first in a job with a relative-
ly high proportion of on-the-job training and then, as time goes on, in
jobs involving little human capital investment. On the other hand, the
models cannot purport to be general equilibrium, because the gross rate of
return on capital is set exogenously.
Conceptually, the incorporation of taxes into the analysis is straight-
forward. Because individuals react to net rather than gross magnitudes, the
imposition of a proportional income tax leads to new effective wage and in-
terest rates and hence to new optimal paths of leisure, consumption, savings
3
and humancapital.In practice, the models are sufficiently complex that
the only way to generate useful comparative dynamics results is by meansof
simulations. (See Driffill [1977].)
Similarly, the computation of excess burden poses no serious conceptual
problems. Suppose that in the absence of taxation the individual's consump-
tion and leisure vectors are C0and ,respectively.Then prior to
taxation, lifetime utility is
0 00 u=u(c ,)
whereui) is the utility function. Suppose that the post tax bundles
are C1and9l,sothat post tax utility is
1 1 1 U=u(c,Z)
3The effecisof taxation on human capital accumulationand labor supply
have been studied in a one-period framework by Kesselman [1SV6].—4—
Excess burden is the diminution in utility in excess of that which would
have occurred had the tax been collected as a lump sum, and can be calcu—
lated by the following procedure:Ci) Compute utility with the tax im-
posed Cu1) .(ii)Find utility u2 when the same tax revenue as in (i)
is obtained by a lump sum payment. Ciii) Compute the compensating variation
associated with u2 -u';i.e.,calculate the lump sum payment which will
2 raise utility to u in the presence of the tax.
B. Functional Forms
We could flesh out the general framework just discussed with any number
of models. One that is particularly well suited to our present purpose is
that of Blinder and Weiss (B-W) 119761. They postulate that the individual's
maximandis additively separable over time with a constant discount rate.
The time endowment eachperiod is one, and time not spent on leisure is de-
voted to work and human capital accumulation h ,(h=l-L).Afraction x
of h is devoted to humancapitalaccumulation. x can be thought of as an
index that rates jobs on. the basis of the proportional growth rate in human
capital that they allow. When x =0,potentialearnings are fully realiz-
ed; while x =1is associated with the maximum rate of growth: "pure
schooling." B—W assume that as x decreases, earnings increase less than
in proportion, because combining training and work on—the—job is not equiv-
alent to dividing one's time between working and attending school. The
4mis differs slightly from the definition of excess burden used by
Diamond and McFadden [19741, who define it1as the compensating variation
associatedwith the change fromu0to u minusthetax revenues col-
lected along a compensated demand curve. As Diamond and McFadden as well
as a number of othershave pointed out, the notion of excess burden is
consistentwith a number of possible conceptual experiments. Our is
quite suitable for the purpose at hand. See Auerbach andRosen [1980].—5—
effective fraction of time spent on earning is therefore a function
g(x) ,whichB-W argue is likely to be characterized by g"(x) <0
(p.453.)
The next important component of the model is the human capital
production function. The individual's stock of human capital, K(t)
is equivalent to his potential earnings. B-W assume that the percent-
age growth rate in K is proportional to the amount of time devoted
to human capital accumulation, hx ,lessa constant depreciation
rate, S
(1) K(t) =K(t)(ahx —tS)
where the constant a is the rate of return to "education."This
equation is based upon the assumption that the human capital production
function is homogeneous of degree one in K (Blinder and Weiss 11976,
p.455].)
5
Theremaining equation in the B-W model is simply an accounting
identity which relates saving (A) to the stock of physical assets (A)
therate of return to physical assets Cr),earningsCg (x)hK),and
consumption:
(.2) A=rA+g(x)hK-c.
In order to make the Blinder-weiss model operationalfor our simula-
tions, first we must postulate specific functioral. forms forthe lifetime
utility function, and for g(x),theeffective fraction of time spent on earning.
5There are alsoa number of non-negativity constraints which are not
detailed here.-6-




where c(>O) ,E(>O),W(<O), B(>0) and p(>O) are parameters, and T
is the length of life. This specification, of course, is far from general:
leisure and consumption are separable, the elasticity of the marginal utility of
consumption is constant, and a constant percentage rate of change of the marginal
utility of leisure is imposed. Unfortunately, allowing for non-separability
would render the problem virtually intractable. Utility function (3) is chosen
because it is tractable and yields interesting results. It is, incidentally,
considerably more general than others that have appeared earlier in this
literature.6 (See, for example, Levhari and Sheshinski [1979], whoimplicitly
set E=land W=O..)
utility of leisure is imposed. However, this functional form is tractable,
yields interesting results, and is considerably more general than the one
used by Levhari and Sheshinski, who implicitly set E =1and W =0
For the effective fraction of time spent on earning, we choose a
quadratic functional form:
(4) g(x) = — (1+)x+1 (0 >> —1)
6EconometriCtesting of whether or not theseparability assumption is
correctis very difficult. For example, the careful studyof Blundell and
Walker (1981) rejects separability, buttheir specification ignores both
saving and the role of humancapitalin determining of the wage.—7—
Finally, B-W's budget constraint (2) must be modified to allow for
7
the existence of personal taxes. For a proportional income tax at rate
t
y
(2) A =(l—t)(rA+g(x)hK) —c
and for an expenditure tax at rate te
(2") A =rA÷ g(x)hK it
The solution to the problem o maximizing (3) subject to U),(2),
(or 12') or C2")) and 14) is obtained by applying Pontryagin's maximum
principle.The optimal paths for the variables in the general case are
described in detail by B—W.
A possible limitation of our model is its partial equilibrium nature.
Following Levhari and Sheshinski [1972], Feldstein [1978], Hec]Qnan [1976],
and many others, we assume that the pre—tax rate of return is invariant
with respect to changes in the tax system. As King [1980] and Fullerton,
Shoven and Whalley [1978] have pointed out, it might be more appropriate
to analyze broad based taxes in a general equilibrium framework. Given, our de-
sire to concentrat9upon the human capital and life cycle aspects of the
8
problem, such a course would appear to be computationally infeasible.
ince all variables in the modelare in real terms, we are not able
to analyze the distortive effects of an unindexed tax system in the presence
of inflation.
8
'Moreover, King 11980] has pointed out thatifthe government has
available to it certain policy instruments in addition to taxrates(e.g.,
debt policy), then the gross rate of return can be set optimally, indepen—
dent of taxrates.—8—
C.Parameter Values
As noted above, for models of this complexity, the only way to obtain
interesting results on the efficiency effects of taxation is by means of
simulations based on specific parameter values. A number of attempts have
been made to estimate jointly the parameters of human capital models. (See,
e.g., Heckinan 11976] or Rosen 119761 .} However,serious econometric prob-
lems arise in the course of estimation, and the results cannot be viewed
with great confidence. Our strategy, therefore, is to piece together a
set of parameter values by appealing to empirical studies in various parts
of the literature. One of the advantages of a simulation methodology is
that the sensitivity of our substantive results to changes in the parameters
can be examined.
1. The Rate of Thterest.
The model assumes that the individual can borrow and lend at the s.me
interest rate. Historically, in the U.S. the average of long term real
before tax interest rates has been quite low. Brown 11976] and Feldstein
11973] have suggested a figure of 3 or 4 percent, about the growth rate of
real output. Interest rates inferred from optimal human capital accuinula—
tion models vary widely. Ben—Porath. 11970] found an implied interest rate
of about 20%, while Haley's 11974] estimate was between 5 and 8 percent, We
settle upon a valtie for r of 5%.-9-
2. Rate ofReturn to Education.
Estimatingthe return to education isa well-established activity,
and the evidence indicates that the return depends on the level of educa-
tion, assumptions concerning mortality, etc. (See the survey by
Psacharopoulos [1973].) We choose a conservative estimate of 5%. Note,
however, that in the simulations h is scaled so that its "normal" value
is one—half. Therefore, in order for a normal yearts work at school to
increase potential earnings by 5%, the value for a must be set at twice
that, i.e., 0.10.
3. Depreciation of HumanCapital.
Several estimates of the hmian capital depreciation rate are avail-
able. Heckman 11976] computed a figure of 3.7% for people with 13—16
years of education and 7% for people with 16 years of school. Haley 11976]
foundratesin the region of 3—4%, and Mincer's 11974] estimate was
At the same time an individual ages, his human capital may be growin9 in
value due to economy-wide increases in productivity. In our models, 6
reflectsthe net effects of depreciation and exogenous increases in prod-
uctivity. We settle upon a value of 6of—0.01, which is consistent with
(say) a 4% annual growth in productivity and a 3% reduction in potential
earnings due to aging.
9
Theseestimates are all generated by odels, in which..gros.shuman
capital accumulation is constrained to be positive throughout the lie—
time, and may he biased if there is a phase of pure work" during some-
partof the lifetime.— 10—
4.Length of Life.
It is assumed that the beginning of economic life occurs at the end
of compulsory education, and that differences in human capital accumulat—
cci to that point are exogenous to the model. We set T =55,which might
be interpreted as the horizon of a plan made at age 15 by a person with a
life of 70 years.
5. Utility Functions.
The parameter E of equation (11 is the elasticity of the marginal
utility of income. As Maital 11976] has noted, a value of 1.5 crops up
often in the literature, and it is used in many of our simulations. We
choose B ,theparameter that iuultiplies leisure in the utility function,
so that it is consistent with econometric results on the supply of labor.
More specifically, we take Kiefer's 11975] estimate of 0.181 for the frac-
tion of a change in nonlabor income spent on leisure, and work backwards
from the first order conditions to find the implied value of B (condition-
al on a value of E =1.5).Thisresults in a value of B equal to
about 20.0.
The parameters a and W affect the relative preferences for con-
sumption and leisure, and only their ratio matters. For each. simulation,
we set them so that a period of "pure schooling" of approximatelythree
years. occurs at the beginning of the individual'slife.
6. Endowments.
In order to solve the odel two initial conditions are required, en—
doicunents of hanandphysical capital. The humancapitalendowment, K0— 11—
isset at $13,000, implying that if the individual devoted the entire
year to work, he would earn $13,000.(As noted above, the "normal"
individualwould be working only half time.) The endowment of non-human
capital A ,isset at zero.
7. Productivity of On-The-Job Training
No direct evidence on the productivity of on-the—job training as re-
flected in the parameter of equation (2) is available. Therefore,
was chosen by experimenting with alternative values, and setting it with
reference to its effects on the simulated life—cycles. These experiments
showed that the principal effect of changing was to alter the length
of the period of on-the-job training (OJT) in the model. Following a sug-
gestion by l4incer 119741, we assume that OJT is completed at about age 47,
which is consistent with =-0.25.
8. The Rate of Time Preference.
Blinder and Weiss show that if p >r+6an individual will "retire"
at the beginning of his life, if at all, whereas if p <r+6,anindi-
vidual may retire at the end of his life. The size of p also affects the
profiles of consumption and leisure over the individual's life. The rate
of growth of consumption is (r-p)/E .Duringthe schooling phase, hours
of non-leisure rise at a rate h =p/Band during the working phase of life,
they fall if r +6-p>0since h =— (r+6—p)/B
A "stylized fact" of lifetime labor supply is that hours of ion—leisure ac-
tivity (h(t)) at first rise with age, reaching a peak in middle life, and then
fall somewhat. This suggests a value of p in the range 0 <P <r+6— 12—
Itseems reasonable too that consumption should rise gently over the life-
cycle, suggesting p <r.Withinthis range variations in the value of
p had small effects on the simulations, and a value of p =.01was used.
III. SIMULATIONS
With specific functional forms and parameter values in hand, we can
compute the excess burden of any given tax system. The procedure is as
10
follows: Solve the model assuming no taxation, generating the optimal
pre—tax paths of hian capital accumulation, savings, consumption, leisure
and hence (by substituting into equation (3))avalue for lifetime util-
ity. Then solve the model with budget constraint (2') in order to find
post—tax utilityu1.Next,find the utility level (u2) which results
when the present value of the income tax receipts is extracted from the
individual as a lump sum. Finally, compute the amount by which the non-
human wealth endowment, A ,mustbe increased to raise utility from u1
to u2 .Thisamount is the excess burden of the tax.
In the process of doing these calculations, a good deal of interest-
ing comparative dynamics information is generated. For the sake of brevity,
10The solution of the model is obtained by a numerical method. The
solution is defined by differential equations describing the motion of the
state variables (assets A and human capital K )andtwo co—state vari-
ables, and the initial conditions and transversality conditions on the
values of those variables. For any given set of initial values, the dif—
ferentialequations define a path and a set of terminal values. The numer—
icalalgorithm oundthecorrectinitia1valtiesofthestate: and co—state
variablesand' solved the differential equationsnumerigall.using discrete,
piecew!1se—ltnear apro.ciiu.tins tø the true, continuous, noitlinear functions
The a1gorLtbmisDO2ADLefthe Fortran NAG Numerica1 Algorithm Group)
Library, and theca1iiiatjonswerè dOneorranICL2970 computer at Southampton
University.— 13—
theseresults are not reported here in any depth. The reader is referred
to Driffill 119771 for a thorough discussion. One should note, however,
the interesting result that in this model a proportional income tax in—
11
creases human capital accumulation.This is due to two mutually rein-
forcing effects. The tax lowers net earnings, and for some values
Qf the parameters, individuals reduce leisure, increasing both
training and working. At the same time, the income tax reduces the effec—
12
tive interest rate, which also tends to encourage human investment. (The
decrease in the interest rate increases the attractiveness of human capital
visvis physical capital as a vehicle for carrying consumption into the
future, ceteris paribus.)
We begin ou.r simulations by examining how excess burden iraries with
the income tax rate and with the behavioral parameters. In the next set,
lifetime excess burdens are computed on the assumption that human capital
accumulation is exogenous. Because this assumption is implicitly made in
most studies of the efficiency of taxation, it is of some interest to see
whether or not it leads to large differences in the estimates. Next, we
11
The magnitude of the response depends upon particular parameter values
and stage of the life cycle, but tends to be substantial. Around the neighbor-
hood of t =0 ,whenB=20 ,andE=2.0 ,theelasticity of lifetime human
capital wih respect to tis about -0.09 .Inthe absence of very much
econometric evidence on th long—run elasticity of human capital with respect
to its rate of return, it is hard to say whether or not this value is realistic
(although Willis and Rosen [1979] have found very large values for the elas-
ticity of the probability of college attendance with respect to its return).
It is likely that a model with capital market constraints would lead to less
responsiveness, but this is beyond the scope of the present paper.
similar effect is found by Heckman [1976]. Again, the precise re-
sponse depends upon the specific parameters. For most values of B and E used
in this study, the elasticity of lifetime human capital accumulation with
respect to the interest rate is about —3.5— 14—
calculateexcess burden on the assumption that leisure is not a choice
variable, which is close to the spirit of the Levhari-Shesh.inski model,
and leads us to the kind of results that might have been obtained if
they had attempted numerical solutions. Finally, we use the model to
compare the efficiency of income and consumption taxes, an exercise of
considerable interest given the current policy debate over the relative
merits of these two tax bases.
1. Excess Burden of an Income Tax.
Table I shows how the excess burden of a proportional income tax
depends upon the tax rate (ty)and the utility function parameters.
Thus, for example, when the tax rate is 0.05, E =1.5and B =15,lifetime
tax revenues are $4,021, and the liftetime excess burden is $646. The following
observations are based upon the table:
(a)For a giyen taxrate, reasonable changes in theutility func-
tion parameters change the excess burden somewhat, but not wildly. The
figures arequitesimilar, except for the case of E =0.5,andthis
value ofEis ratherfar from thet!consensushl value for the elasti—
cityof the marginalutility ofincome.
(b) givenvalues of B and E ,theexcess burden increases
aproximate1y with. the square ofthe taxxate.This result accords with.
intuitions deye1oed in the simple static case forsmallchanges in the
taxrate.Whenthealgebraic express-ion forthe famous "Harberger tri-
angle" is written in elasticity form, it indicatesthat excess burden
variesin direct proportion to. the square of the advalorem tax rate.
(Harberger 11964, p. 45J.}— 15—
TABLEI
ExcessBurden of a ProportionalIncome Tax


































































Cc)As a proportion of taxcollections,the excess burdens are con—
siderably higherthan those which have been generated in static models.
Analysis of static models has yielded ratios of excess burden to tax rev-
enue under 5%.(See Harberger 11964, p. 51] or Rosen 11978, p. 512].)
In contrast, Table I indicates a ratio of about 15% for low tax rates, and
about 80% for higher tax rates. This large discrepancy between the static
andlife-cycleresults suggests that ignoring the endogeneity of human
capital may lead to serious underestimates of excess burden.
2.Excess Burden with Human Capital Fixed.
In light of point (c) above, it is important to know what the excess
burdens would have been if we had (mistakenly) assumed that human capital
investments are fixed exogenously. We consider the following experiment:
fora given set ofbehavioral parameters, and assuming no taxes, generate
the. optimal lire cycle plan as before. Now impose a proportional income
tax, :but constrain the growth of human capital investment to be exactly
the ame as it was in the pre—tax situation. Taxes, then, can distort the
leisure—income tradeoff daring a given period as well as interteiuporal con—
surnption decisions, but they haye no effect on human capital.
The outcome of this experiment is shown in Table II. Compared to
Table I, the most striking aspect is the dra.iatic fall in the ratio of ex—
cess burden to tax revenues. The figures. are now n the order of 2 to3%
for low tax rates, and 10 or 15% or higher tax rates. Thus, as conjectur-
ed aboye, the failure to consider human capital accumulation generates sub-
stantial downward errors in excess burden calculations. Itis also note-
worthy that thi faIlure leads to overestimates of tax revenues.17 -
TABLE II
Excess Burden of a Proportional Income TaxAssumingFixed Human Capital






























































The reason for this overestimate is related to the fact, noted above,
that the income tax leads to expansion of human capital. The increase in
human capital delays the individual's earnings and increases the value of
his debts. Both of these effects reduce the present value of tax revenue
relative to what it would have been had human capital been fixed, and they
more than offset the revenue effects of the tax—induced increases in earn-
ings capacity.
3.Excess Burden with Fixed Labor Supply
It is often assumed in human capital models that the individual's goal
is income maximization rather than utility maximation. In the next set of
simulations, we investigate the errors that might be induced when the leisure—
income tradeoff is not taken into account. To do so, we first compute the
optimal lifetime plan in the absence of taxation. We then recompute the plan
including taxes, but constraining the values of leisure to their pre—tax
values, although human capital decisions are still endogenous.
The results are shown in Table III. Compared to Table I, there are
smaller excess burdens, but the differences are not as dramatic as those in
Table II. Failing to consider the distortionary effects of taxes on the
leisure-income choice does not lead to as much of an error as ignoring the
endogeneity of human capital. This perhaps suggests that more effort should
be devoted to estimating the effects of taxes on human capital accumulation,
and less to refining estimates of the elasticity of hours of work with re-
spect to the tax rate.— 19—
TABLEIII
Excess Burden of a Proportional Income Tax AssumingFixed Labor Supply
CT =55,a =0.1,r =0.05,=—.25,K =13,000)
t =.05 t =.l0 t =.20 ________ y y
Utility Tax Excess Tax Excess Tax Excess
Function RevenuesBurden RevenuesBurdenRevenuesBurden
E=l.5, B=15 4404 514 7744 2111 13320 6965
E1.5, B20 4277 525 7475 1949 12790 7017
E1.5, B=30 4179 538 7259 1987 12330 7086
E0.5,B=20 9197 696 16520 2720 28540 10730
E=1.0,B=20 549S 578 9721 2177 6680 8040
E=2.0,B=20 3734 503 6463 1852 11010 6562— 20—
4. Income Versus Consumption Taxation
A major debate in public finance concns the merits of consumption
versus income taxation. An important issue is therelative efficiencies
of the two tax bases. In order to investigate this matter, we did the
following:(i) For a given income tax rate, compute lifetime tax revenues
and excess burden as before.(ii) Find the consumption tax rate (te of
equation (")) that generates the same present value of tax revenues.(iii)
Compute the excess burden associated with the consumption tax,and examine
its ratio to that of the income tax.
Before presenting these results, it should be emphasized that although
our utility function (3) is separable in consumption and leisure, itis not
homothetic in leisure. If homotheticity obtained, then a consumption tax
would be more efficient than an income tax, independent of the parameter values
chosen. Given (3), however, it cannot be known a priori which tax is more ef-
ficient.(See Atkinson and Stiglitz 119761 or Auerbach [19791.)
Theresults are shown in the first three columns of Table IV. Each
entry gives the ratio of the excess burden of a consumption tax to that of
an equal yield incometax, foreach income taxrateand set of utility
functionparameters.(Thus, for example, if E=1.5,B =15,andthe
incometax is 0.05, then the excess burden of a consumption tax is 2.1% of
the excess burden of an equal yield income tax.) The figures suggest that
for all parameter values, the consumption tax is considerably more efficient
than the income tax, and that the relative efficiency is an increasing func-
tion of the income tax rate.
Because consumption taxation is often analyzed using models which ig-
nore human capital, it is of some interest to see how these results would
have changed if we had assumed exogenous human capital accumulation. The
outcomes are shown in the last three columns of Table IV. A glance at these— 21—
TABLEIV
Relative Excess Burdens of Consumption and Income Taxes
CT =55,a0.1, r =0.05,=—0.25,K =13,000)
EnaQgeuousHuman epita1 Fixed Hun Cital
Utility (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Function .t=0.05t =0.10t =0.20t =0.05t =0.10t =0.20 _____y y y •y y y
E1.5,B150.021 0.015 0.00880.098 0.096 0.092
E=1.5,B=20 0.015 0.011 0.00690.083 0.082 0.080
E=l.5,B=30 0.010 0.0076 0.00480.067 0.064 0.064
E=0.5,B=20 0.083 0.089 0.044 0.133 0.119 0.094
E=1.0,B=20 0.027 0.021 0.014 0.090 0.086 0.080
E=2.0,B=20 0.011 0.0073 0.00430.081 0.081 0.081— 22—
ratiosindicates that although they are still small (generally under 0.10),
they are larger than their counterparts in the first half of the table.
Thus, failure to take human capital into account would bias downwards one's
estimate of the efficiency gains achievable by moving from an income tax to
aconsumption tax.
Ofcourse, we cannot claim that these simulations have "proven"thata
consumption tax is more efficient than an income tax.Theresults, after
all, are consequences of the specific functional forms we have chosen. It
isnevertheless interesting to see this conclusion fall out of a model of
a sort that has achieved widespread acceptance in other contexts.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Most attempts to analyze the excess burden of taxation have relied on
static models. A few studies have viewed excess burden in a dynamic con-
text but these have ignored the potentially important role of human
capital accumulation. In this paper, we have used simulations to analyze
a more general model which explicitly allows or endogenous human capital
decisions.
Our results suggest that conventional measures of excess burden seri-
ously understate the true' éfficienOy losses of taxation. This outcome
occurs despite the fact that we impose on the model a ratherconservative
yalue forthe. rate of return to education. As stressed above, noclaims
to: perfect .9enerãlity can be made because our results are conditional upon
specific functional forms andparameteryalues. However, we did attempt
to make. these as t1realistic" .aspossible. .Noreover,previous .attemptshave
usedl assumptions considerably more restrictive than our own,— 23—
whilesearching for parameter values fo.r the model, we discovered a
surprising scarcity of estimates of the impact of taxes on human capital
accumulation. Our simulation results suggest that there mightbea
high payoff to econometric work that improves upon these estimates.— 24—
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